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There are very many topics in philosophy of science on which Alan Musgrave and I 
see eye to eye. So it has not been easy to do the decent Popperian thing and pick a 
(friendly) fight with him.  However, thinking again about his much-read 1974 paper 
on theory-confirmation (‘Logical versus Historical Theories of Confirmation’) solved 
my problem. Despite having much of its heart in most of the right places, both the 
argument of that paper and the position it ends up endorsing are, I believe, 
importantly off-beam. In this paper I shall explain why and clarify what I think is the 
correct account of the issue that he addressed.  I shall then take the opportunity to 
contrast my views on confirmation with those of Deborah Mayo, who was herself 
much influenced by Alan Musgrave’s paper and who has developed her own view on 
the issues it raises.  Although Alan’s paper was published in 1974, the problem it 
faces has not been given a satisfactory resolution – at least not one that has met 
widespread acceptance.  So it remains a live issue within current philosophy of 
science. 
 
Musgrave begins his paper with a sharp formulation of the prediction versus 
accommodation issue: is there some epistemic premium on predictive success? That 
is, does a theory obtain, ceteris paribus, more confirmation from a piece of evidence 
that it correctly predicts than it does from an otherwise ‘equivalent’ piece of known 
evidence that it correctly entails? 
 
He takes it that a ‘purely logical’ account of confirmation must answer ‘no’ to this 
question. Any such account sees confirmation as entirely based on the logical 
relationships between the theory, T, and the piece of evidence, e, at issue; and hence 
must entail, whatever the details of the logical relationships it highlights, that whether 
or not e was already known to hold when T was proposed is entirely irrelevant to 
confirmation. All logical accounts have their difficulties  - in particular, in 
Musgrave’s view, they supply no satisfactory answer to the ‘paradox of 
confirmation.’ 
 
An historical (or more accurately – as he allows - a “logico-historical”) account, on 
the other hand, sees confirmation as a relationship, not just between T and e, but also 
a third variable: ‘background knowledge’, b.  All variants of the historical view entail 
that T fails to be confirmed by any e that is in b, even if T (of course, in conjunction 
with appropriate initial conditions and auxiliaries) entails e. All variants of this 
account are indeed at least partly historical since the answer to the question ‘does e 
confirm T?’ may be different in two different historical epochs, because these will be 
characterised by different states of background knowledge. 
 
But which evidential results exactly should belong in ‘background knowledge’ and 
hence fail to be possible confirmers of new theories?  Musgrave distinguishes three 
versions of the historical approach, based on three different answers to this question. 
 
According to the first account, ‘the strictly temporal view’, background knowledge 
contains ‘all the relevant experimental results, hypotheses, etc., which are “known to 
science” when [the] theory [in question] was proposed’ (p.8).  This entails that a 
theory T is only confirmed by facts that were unknown at the time of T’s initial 
proposal and cannot be confirmed by any evidence that was already known to hold.  
Musgrave points out both that this suggestion flies in the face of quite clear-cut 
intuitions about some particular cases (e.g. that GTR was confirmed by getting the 
already well-known details of the precession of Mercury’s perihelion right) and that it 
seems difficult to see a general rationale for giving such a crucial role to purely 
temporal considerations. 
 
On the second account, the ‘heuristic view’, the relevant background knowledge for 
assessing the confirmation of theory T is restricted to those known facts and results 
that were involved in the development of T.  This gives scope for the recapture of 
some of the intuitive judgments about particular cases: GTR may be confirmed by the 
details of Mercury’s orbit, for example, provided that those details played no role in 
the construction of GTR.  However, aside from the issue of whether there is a 
convincing rationale for this account, it is, argued Musgrave, altogether too person-
relative: ‘ [i]f different scientists take different routes to the same theory, then the 
evidential support of that theory as proposed by one of them might be different from 
its evidential support as proposed by the other.’(p.14) And he, not unreasonably it 
would seem, regards this as in effect a reductio ad absurdum of the account. 
 
Musgrave is inclined to endorse the third variant (‘for my money it is the best version 
of the historical approach to confirmation’(p.19))  This holds that the relevant 
‘background knowledge’ for T consists only of the ‘touchstone theory’ for T – in 
effect T’s most plausible rival.  A theory T is then confirmed by any correct piece of 
evidence e that it entails provided that e is not also entailed by its ‘touchstone’ T’.   
Clearly there will in general be two types of such evidence: evidence that contradicts 
the touchstone T’ and evidence on which T’ is simply silent. On this account, GTR is 
confirmed by getting the details of Mercury’s perihelion correct, since its rival, 
classical physics, gets those details wrong. Ditto with the Special Theory and, say, the 
Michelson-Morley result.1  On the other hand, neither STR nor GTR is confirmed by 
any result that classical physics also correctly entails.   
 
But why would anyone want to endorse these judgments delivered by the third 
variant?  Of course, scientists will be especially interested in the question of whether 
Relativity theory is better confirmed, gets greater empirical support from the total 
evidence, than classical physics, and this will direct special attention to those pieces 
of evidence that are entailed by Relativity but not also by classical physics.  But all 
that we can justifiably say is that those phenomena that they jointly entail fail to 
distinguish between them or supply no basis for a preference for one of them; it does 
not of course follow that the jointly entailed phenomena fail to support the new 
theory.  Surely the reasonable judgement is that both classical physics and relativity 
theory are confirmed by, say, the precession of the equinoxes since they both entail 
the relevant data - this is why that phenomenon, unlike, say, the precession of 
Mercury’s perihelion, is irrelevant to the comparison of the degrees of evidential 
support of the two theories. 
 
                                                 
1 Of course it depends which particuar versions of classical physics we are considering – therein lies 
much of the tail that will unfold in this paper. 
Indeed, Musgrave’s preferred alternative not only fails to have an obvious general 
rationale, it would lead to any number of intuitively extremely awkward 
consequences. Consider what the account says, for example, not about the 
confirmation of the newer theory in some case of inter-theoretic rivalry but about the 
confirmation of the older one.  The account seems clearly committed to the view that, 
for example, Newton’s theory was confirmed by, say, the precession of the equinoxes 
in, say, 1900 (when its ‘touchstone theory’ was what? Galileo’s (very partial) 
mechanics? or Aristotle’s more comprehensive but hopeless system?); but by 1914, 
when nothing had changed either in the theory or (of course) in the phenomena, it was 
no longer confirmed by those phenomena because a new theory, Relativity, had arisen 
that equally well entailed a correct description of them. (The alternative suggestion 
within this approach – that the right way to view the empirical support gained by a 
theory is always to take as background knowledge that theory’s chief rival at the time 
it was introduced - is worse, much worse. This alternative would, admittedly, allow 
Newton’s theory to retain its support from phenomena such as the precession of the 
equinoxes or the existence of Neptune, but it would of course have the consequence 
that, as well as there being empirical phenomena (like the Michelson-Morley 
experiment, and the precession of Mercury’s perihelion) that support Relativity but 
not Classical Physics, there are also phenomena (like the precession of the equinoxes 
or the existence of Neptune) that support Classical Physics but not Relativity. And 
this, despite the fact that Relativity entails correct descriptions of these phenomena 
too! 
 
We saw that Musgrave castigates the other two alternative construals of the historical 
approach as lacking any obvious rationale, but, as we have just now seen, his own 
preferred version certainly does no better.  This surely raises the general issue: Why 
should ‘background knowledge’ in any form be a factor in empirical support? There is 
of course, as just remarked, an obvious rationale for taking it to be a factor in 
increased support: if we are interested in why new theory T is better supported than 
its earlier rival T’, then results that T’ has already either predicted or explained will be 
in background knowledge and will drop out of the equation – if T’ had already got e 
correct, then, even should T also yield e, then this trivially will provide no reason to 
prefer it over T’.  But it seems difficult to see why the fact that an empirical result e is 
already in background knowledge in any sense should by itself totally rule out e as 
support for some newly proposed theory T, in the non-incremental sense of support.  
(In the context of the Bayesian account of empirical support this is of course the 
‘problem of old evidence’.)   
 
Various remnants of Popperianism in Alan Musgrave’s paper suggest that he holds 
that a justification for giving background knowledge this central role might be 
developed by considering which bits of evidence do or do not supply a proper test of 
the theory concerned. Now it is true, of course, that if we already know that e holds 
rather than some alternative result of the experiment or observation it describes, the 
fact that it turns out that some new theory T entails e rather than any of the 
alternatives will not have us on the edge of our seats wondering if the theory might 
turn out to be refuted.  In that sense there is no test from old data. But why should that 
sense have the slightest epistemic relevance?  The new theory is by no means a priori 
guaranteed to correctly entail all the phenomena correctly entailed by its predecessor. 
(Indeed if Popper’s account of new theories as ‘bold conjectures’ were true, it would 
be a miracle if this happened in a field where the old theory had had any considerable 
degree of empirical success). Still less is there an a priori guarantee that the new 
theory will get right all known phenomena – whether or not dealt with successfully by 
its predecessor. And indeed few, if any, theories do get all known phenomena correct 
(at least when first proposed). There is, then, a clear sense in which such a theory was 
tested by the already known data: it might have entailed different data that contradicts 
that actually recorded, but in fact it didn’t.   To the extent that a theory might have got 
some already known phenomenon wrong, but in fact got it right, it seems perverse to 
rule ahead of time, that this success fails to count as surviving a ‘test’, and so cannot 
yield any degree of empirical support for that theory. 
 
Hence Alan Musgrave’s solution is wrong; and, as so often in philosophy, this is 
because he has got the problem wrong.2
 
The real problem: prediction versus accommodation 
 
The problem is not whether new evidence counts more than old – it doesn’t (at any 
rate it doesn’t just because it’s new).  The problem is adhocness (indeed the real 
problem is perhaps seeing that the adhocness problem is the only problem in this 
area). In the early 19th Century, the classical wave theory of light predicted the results 
of various diffraction or interference experiments.  Intuitively these results told very 
strongly in favour of this theory against its rival  - the emission or corpuscular theory 
of light. Yet, as we would predict on Duhemian grounds, the emissionists by no 
means immediately surrendered. Duhem emphasised that single ‘isolated’ theories 
such as the corpuscular theory have no empirical consequences of their own, but 
achieve them only when conjoined with both specific assumptions (what velocities do 
the light-corpuscles have? And what masses? Most importantly what forces are they 
subjected to in particular circumstances?) plus further auxiliary and instrumental 
assumptions. 
 
It follows that there is always logical leeway for holding onto the central theory in the 
light of experimental ‘anomalies’ and looking to modify either a specific or auxiliary 
assumption.  18th and 19th century corpuscularists duly obliged – some postulated, for 
example, a force of diffraction, exercised on the light-corpuscles as they passed the 
edges of any ‘gross’ opaque object; others considered the possibility that the fringe 
phenomena that wave theorists attributed to interference and/or diffraction were in 
fact physiological phenomena.  Although in this case it was never achieved, it clearly 
has to be possible in principle for the emissionists to have given themselves an 
expression for the ‘force of diffraction’ with so many parameters that, any given 
particular fringe phenomenon could have been accommodated. Certainly by appealing 
to (unknown) physiological facts about vision an entirely cheap corpuscularist 
‘explanation’ was suggested at the time and could have been developed in some 
detail.   
 
                                                 
2 Before outlining what I see as the real problem and its solution, however, I need to note his 
characterisation of  ‘independent testability’. Musgrave takes it that the idea that what scientific 
theories need to be accepted is not just testability, but independent testability is captured by the third 
variant of the historical approach: T is independently testable through any of its empirically checkable 
consequences that are not also consequences of its ‘touchstone’ T’.   As we shall see, independent 
testability is the key both to the correct construal of the problem here and its solution, but Musgrave’s 
account of independent testability is the wrong one. Probably just a footnote 
Or consider another case where this sort of dodge definitely works (‘works’ in the 
sense that it does produce a theory that yields the accommodated data, not of course in 
the sense that it produces a scientifically respectable theory.)  
 
The fossil record looks like strong confirmation of the Darwinian theory of evolution. 
(Of course the situation is rather complex in this example because that theory does not 
actually deductively entail any particular aspect of the fossil record, but this is 
inessential to the point at issue.)  As is well known, however, it is trivially easy for the 
“scientific” creationist to “match” this success.  All that she needs to do is follow 
Gosse and assert that God decided, when creating the Universe in 4004 BC, to include 
some pretty pictures in some rocks that look awfully like the marks of the skeletons of 
now extinct organisms but are in fact just pretty pictures, and to include some buried 
bone-like objects that seem to fit together to form the skeletons of impressive and now 
extinct creatures but are in fact just artefacts, and so on.  She will thus create a version 
of “scientific” creationism that entails the correct facts about the (now alleged) “fossil 
record”, but clearly it would be absurd to hold that this means that the view that this 
record supports the Darwinian theory over its rival must be abandoned. 
 
There is a long tradition in science of deeply engrained distrust of such ad hoc moves. 
We surely require an account of the confirmation of theories by evidence that 
underwrites the judgement that the interference effects continued to give grounds to 
prefer the wave theory in the early 19th century even once it had been indicated that 
emissionist accounts could be constructed, and similarly underwrites the judgment 
that the fossil record continues to give good empirical reason to prefer the Darwinian 
theory even after creationists have availed themselves of the ‘Gosse dodge’.  But how 
exactly are we to capture these judgments within a generally defensible account of 
confirmation?  
 
The obvious initial suggestion is to say that no theory can be confirmed by evidence 
that it has simply accommodated in this ad hoc way, where the advocates of the 
theory have taken the evidence at issue as given and used it to produce a specific 
version of their favoured theory that yields that evidence.  These are, at least when the 
notion is used liberally, all exercises in parameter-fitting.  The idea behind the 
‘diffracting force’ emissionist account of fringe-phenomena was to start from a very 
complicated expression for the force as a function of the distance from the diffracting 
object (allowing this to be attractive at some distances and repulsive at others) and 
then use particular fringe measurements to fix those parameter values so that the 
required phenomena are entailed. Similarly, the Creationist’s general theory – that 
God created the Universe in 4004 B.C. ‘essentially’ as it now is - effectively gives 
him a whole series of ‘free parameters’ specifying how exactly it was that God chose 
to create the universe: if you observe particular patterns in some rocks, then that 
specifies one part of God’s creation, you tie this ‘parameter’ value down on the basis 
of the observation and, unsurprisingly, produce a specific theory that entails the 
observed data - the theory being of course that God created the Universe not just any 
old how but in particular with these patterns in these rocks. 
 
The positive side of the account would then be that a theory is confirmed by any piece 
of data a correct description of which it entails, provided that the evidence was not 
used in the construction of the specific version of the theory that entails it, whether or 
not the data was already known.  There appears to be, then, an important 
methodological distinction between accommodation and prediction in the general 
sense in which it is often used in science (meaning simply that some evidence follows 
from a theory without having needed to be accommodated within it)3. 
 
This ‘heuristic account’ is essentially Alan Musgrave’s second variant of the 
historical view. Any version of the historical view says that elements of the relevant 
‘background knowledge’ fail to confirm, even when entailed by the theory concerned 
and the second version of this view specifies that the particular elements of 
‘background knowledge’ that fail to support a theory are just those elements that were 
used in the construction of the theory.  This account, which I have before defended 
myself in a number of places,4 has a couple of immediate advantages: first it accords 
with a range of intuitive judgments about particular cases (one such is the precession 
of Mercury’s perihelion and the General Theory of Relativity) where ‘old evidence’ is 
taken to provide strong support for a theory and secondly (and of course relatedly) it 
relegates the time-order of theory and evidence in itself to what it should be – namely, 
a complete historical irrelevance (what possible general justification could there be 
for old evidence always to count less?). 
 
However the heuristic account has been alleged to face at least two fundamental 
objections of its own.  The objection that Musgrave himself cites, as we already 
noted, concerns the fact that the account seems to make theory-confirmation an 
unacceptably relativistic (enquirer-relative) affair: 
 
“If different scientists take different heuristic routes to the same theory, then the 
evidential support of that theory as proposed by one of them might be different from 
its evidential support as proposed by the other. In short, Zahar’s [heuristic] view 
makes confirmation a person-relative affair.” (op. cit.,p.14) 
 
An evenly more frequently voiced criticism of the heuristic view is that, just like the 
purely temporal view that it replaces, it flies in the face of deeply held intuitions about 
particular cases.  Nickles, Mayo, Howson and others5 have all pointed to cases in 
which evidence e was used in the construction some theory T and yet where e was, it 
is claimed, taken to provide (strong) support for T.  As Colin Howson, for example, 
claimed, the idea that evidence used in the construction of a theory cannot be used in 
its support  "makes nonsense of quite basic and eminently reasonable scientific 
appraisals" and is on that and other accounts "entirely bogus".6  In the next two 
sections, I address these objections in turn and in the process give what I hope is an 
important clarification of exactly what the heuristic view does and does not claim.7
 
First objection against the heuristic view: used data sometimes (strongly) 
confirms 
 
It will be best to address first the direct criticism – that there are clear cut cases where 
used data confirms (even strongly confirms) the theory in whose construction it was 
                                                 
3 quote from French 
4 ref 
5 ref 
6 ref 
7 My treatment here follows and builds upon that given in my [2002] – actually written for a 
conference in 1999. 
used; the response to this will then indicate the answer to Alan Musgrave’s ‘overly 
enquirer-relative’ criticism. 
 
Allan Franklin once gave a seminar talk at the LSE under the title ‘Ad hoc is not a 
four letter word’.  Underneath the surface correctness of this title, there lies a 
somewhat deeper but no less correct point: scientists entirely legitimately use data all 
the time in the construction of their theories.  If general theoretical considerations 
leave the value of some important parameter open, then how else would a scientist tie 
down that parameter’s value except by using data?  The only other alternative that 
seems open would be to conjecture a value and then test – but this attempt to find a 
needle in a (generally nondenumerably large) haystack would be madness.  Here is 
one simple but canonical instance. 
 
Suppose a mid-19th Century scientist already accepted the general wave theory of 
light - the theory that light from any particular source consists of waves of some 
wavelength or other transmitted through the luminiferous aether.  This general theory 
does not specify the wavelength of any particular kind of monochromatic light - say 
light from a sodium arc.  The scientist would like a more detailed theory that does 
specify that wavelength.  Rather than attempt to conjecture a value, she would 
‘deduce’ the specific theory, involving the specific value of the wavelength, ‘from the 
phenomena’.  She would look for some consequence, e, of her general theory T, 
where e characterises some observable magnitude (fringe separation in some 
particular experiment, say) as a one-to-one function of the wavelength.  She would 
perform the experiment using light from a sodium arc, measure the magnitude at issue 
- here, the fringe separation (call the result of this measurement e’) - and infer to a 
more specific theory T’.  So for example, subject to a couple of idealisations, it 
follows from the general wave theory that, in the case of the famous two-slit 
experiment, the (observable) distance X from the fringe at the centre of the pattern to 
the first fringe on either side is related to (theoretical) wavelength λ, via the equation 
X/(X2 + D2)1/2 =  λ/d (where d is the distance between the two slits and D the distance 
from the two-slit screen to the observation screen - both of course observable 
quantities).  It follows analytically, of course, that λ= dX/(X2 + D2)1/2.  But all the 
terms on the right hand side of this last equation are measurable.  Hence particular 
observed values will determine the wavelength, and so the more specific theory T’, 
with the parameter that had been free in T now given a precise value. Far from being 
scientifically questionable, this is, to repeat, entirely standard (and patently legitimate) 
scientific procedure.  
 
Several of most celebrated episodes from the history of science involve using data 
(often anomalous data for an earlier theory) to construct a new theory.  For example, 
Adams and Leverrier used the data from Uranus’s orbit that had proved inconsistent 
with the initial Newtonian account essentially as follows. They took it that the basic 
Newtonian theory (of mechanics plus universal gravitation) was correct, and then 
worked backwards from the Uranian data to work out what assumptions would have 
to be made about a further trans-Uranian planet, such that, when that further planet’s 
gravitational interaction with Uranus was taken into account (along of course with the 
gravitational interaction with the sun and the other, already known planets), the 
overall Newtonian theory would ascribe the correct orbit to Uranus.  This manoeuvre, 
as is well known, led to the discovery of Neptune  - one of Newtonian theory’s 
greatest successes and indeed one of the most impressive confirmations of any theory 
in the history of science. 
 
So how in light of facts like these, could anyone have held the ‘heuristic account’ of 
confirmation which seems committed to the view that evidence used in the 
construction of theories cannot confirm those theories?  In the wave theory case in 
particular, there is a very clear sense in which e’, the fringe data used in the 
construction of the more specific wave theory T’ supports that theory: given that the 
general theory T has already been accepted, e’ deductively entails T’, and what better 
support could there be than deductive entailment? 
 
Colin Howson likes to emphasise a still more general sort of case - standard statistical 
examples such as the following  We are given that an urn contains only black and 
white balls though in an unknown proportion; we are prevented from looking inside 
the urn but can draw balls one at a time from it.  Suppose that a sample of size n has 
been taken (with replacement) of which k have been found to be white.  Standard 
statistical estimation theory then recommends the hypothesis that the proportion of 
white balls in the urn is k/n ± ε, where ε is calculated as a function of n by standard 
confidence interval techniques.  The sample evidence is the basis here of the 
particular hypothesis constructed and surely also supports it at least to some degree - 
the evidence for the hypothesis just is that a proportion k/n of the balls drawn were 
white. 
 
Deborah Mayo cites and analyses in more detail the same case and also cites the 
following "trivial but instructive example" ([]p.271).  Suppose one wanted to arrive at 
what she describes as "a hypothesis H" about the average SAT score of the students in 
her logic class.  She points out that the “obvious” – in fact, surely uniquely sensible - 
way to arrive at H is by summing all the individual scores of the n students in the 
class and dividing the result by n.  The "hypothesis" arrived at in this way would 
clearly be "use-constructed".  Suppose the constructed “hypothesis” is that the 
average SAT score for these students is 1121.  It would clearly be madness to suppose 
that the data used in the construction of the "hypothesis" that the average SAT score is 
1121 fails to support that hypothesis.  On the contrary, as she writes:  
 
“Surely the data on my students are excellent grounds for my hypothesis about their 
average SAT scores.  It would be absurd to suppose that further tests would give 
better support.”8 
 
Exactly so: the data provide not just excellent, but, short of some trivial error, entirely 
conclusive grounds for the "hypothesis" - further tests are entirely irrelevant.  (This is 
exactly why it seems odd in the extreme to talk of a "hypothesis" at all in these 
circumstances – a point to which I will return below in my more extensive 
consideration of Mayo’s views.) 
 
Does the admission that these sorts of ‘deductions from the phenomena’ provide 
clear-cut cases of theories that are supported by data used in their construction spell 
the end for the heuristic account of confirmation? 
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To start to see that the answer is ‘no’, consider again the “Gosse dodge” within 
“scientific” Creationism, or indeed any of the other standard cases of blatantly ad hoc 
moves in defence of a theory that have been cited in the literature. In all these cases, 
the specific theory is ‘deduced from the phenomena’ – meaning, as always, of course 
deduced from the phenomena plus already accepted general principles.  This, as 
Newton emphasised, is a very powerful technique in the case where the necessary 
general principles are indeed generally accepted and therefore, presumably, 
themselves have strong evidence in their favour. In the case, however, where some at 
least of the ‘background’ general principles necessary for the deduction of the specific 
theory concerned from the phenomena are simply accepted by some particular group 
and cannot themselves legitimately claim strong empirical support then a much more 
cautious methodological judgment is in order. 
 
While it is indeed it is true that if you were already convinced of the general 
Creationist claim that God created the Universe “essentially” as it now is in 4004 B.C. 
then the data that your irritating Darwinian supporters insist on calling the “fossil 
record” do of course deductively entail the more specific version of your theory that 
says that part of God’s creation was some pretty pictures in the rocks and buried 
bone-like artefacts, and so on.  Those data thus give you not only good but conclusive 
reason to accept that particular version of the general theory that you already accepted 
on other grounds.  In this regard the case is surely no different from the (intuitively 
more scientifically respectable) case of the early 19th Century optical scientist, who, 
being already convinced of the general wave theory, deduces the more specific 
version with specific wavelengths for light from particular monochromatic sources 
from the phenomena: again, given that she accepts the general wave theory, T, the 
fringe data, e’, gives her entirely conclusive reason to accept the particular version of 
the theory T’, involving a now fixed value of an initially free parameter. 
 
But the intuitive reaction to the Creationist/Gosse dodge case is surely that while the 
‘fossil record’ data may indeed give you reason, in fact conclusive reason, to adopt 
the particular Gossefied version of Creationism, this is an ineliminably conditional 
judgment – the evidence gives you absolutely no reason to have adopted the general 
Creationist view in the first place.  If you are going to be any sort of Creationist at all, 
then this data gives you as solid a reason as there could possibly be for being a Gosse-
dodge-Creationist, but it gives you absolutely no reason to be any sort of Creationist 
at all!  There is no reason to think that the general underlying theory itself obtains any 
empirical support just because the specific version of it entails the correct empirical 
data. 
 
What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the Gander.  Exactly the same judgment is 
valid in the (intuitively scientifically respectable) wave theory case: the fringe data, 
e’, give you solid (indeed conclusive) reason to believe T’ (the wave theory with a 
specified wavelength for monochromatic light from a sodium arc), provided that you 
have already accepted the general wave theory (with free parameter), but give you 
absolutely no reason to accept the general wave theory in the first place.  Both in this 
– seemingly legitimate – case and in the, apparently illegitimate case of the Gosse 
dodge, the right judgment seems, then, to be twofold: first that, if the general 
underlying theory is taken as given, then if e is used in the construction of a specific 
version of that general underlying idea, e gives very strong (perhaps conclusive) 
support for the specific theory; however, secondly, there is no support from that 
evidence for the general, underlying theory itself. 
 
A similar remark also applies to Colin Howson’s statistical examples: so long as the 
basic theory or ‘model’ is given (basically in his urn case, that we are dealing with a 
‘Bernouilli process’ with fixed, but unknown parameter p (the proportion of white 
balls in the urn)), then the evidence that k/n of the sampled balls were white gives 
support (in this case of course not conclusive) for the specific theory that estimates p 
as lying in the interval k/n ± ε.  But that data gives no conceivable reason for having 
greater faith in the idea that this is the correct model. (Indeed this is not an issue that 
would normally even arise in that case.) 
 
Reverting to the cases of scientific theory, the intuitive judgment seems to be that in 
some but not all of the cases there is already good empirical reason to accept the 
general underlying theory concerned in these ‘deductions from the phenomena’.  
There was already good reason to accept the general wave theory with the free 
parameter, ahead of any measurement of fringe distances with light from the sodium 
source. Hence, when evidence e turns out deductively to entail the specific theory T’ 
(complete with filled-in value for the wavelength of light from the sodium arc) given 
T, we can intuitively “ discharge the antecedent” and say that e gives us reason to 
accept T’ full stop.  In contrast, in the Gosse dodge case, exactly because there is no 
independent reason to accept the underlying general Creationist account, the fact that 
the fossil record entails the Gosse dodge variant of Creationism, justifies only the 
conditional judgment that e gives us reason to accept the Gosse dodge variant only to 
the extent that we already have reason to accept the general theory. 
 
But how exactly can these general underlying theories earn their independent 
empirical support, as, in some cases it seems they do?  Duhem, after all, taught us that 
these general theories do not have directly checkable empirical consequences of their 
own. All empirical tests of the wave theory of light, for example, are tests of the 
general wave theory plus particular assumptions.   It seems, then, that if this whole 
approach is to be at all coherent, there must be a ‘contrast class’ to the sorts of cases 
we have considered so far.  That is there must be empirical tests, the results of which 
not only confirm the specific version of the theory that entails their results, but also 
confirm the underlying general theory.  Scientists do, in other words, sometimes take 
it that the empirical success of some particular version of a general theory gives good 
reason to accept the general theory itself  - and in particular good reason to seek to 
develop another specific theory for a different field of phenomena based on that same 
general theory. So, for example, the empirical success of Fresnel’s specific wave 
theory of diffraction was taken to provide good reason to develop another specific 
theory based on the same general elastic medium wave theory to deal with the 
phenomena of polarisation and crystal optics. 
 
In sum, scientists do not restrict themselves simply to judgments of the conditional 
kind that we just highlighted – that against the given background of some general 
framework theory, some piece of evidence e gives strong support to some specific 
version of the general theory.  They also sometimes see the general framework theory 
as empirically supported. Yet, as Duhem showed us, such support must always be 
achieved, not directly, but via specific versions of the general theory (i.e. not the 
general theory alone but that theory plus some further assumptions).9  
 
What kinds of evidence perform this trick?  The answer, I think, is two kinds, of 
which the more straightforward is the following.  A scientist starts with some general 
theory T, uses e to fix some parameter in T, to create (by ‘deduction from the 
phenomena’) the more specific theory T’; T’then goes on to make some further 
independent prediction e’. So, to take again the classic case, Newtonians ..       
                                                 
9 not holism – forward reference to Copernicus example. 
